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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals entertained administrative law
cases of considerable number and variety during the recent term. In general,
the court's treatment of these cases was characterized by the traditional def-
erence to the agencies' underlying decisions, and the court stayed well within
the confines of the Administrative Procedure Act's scope of judicial review.I
Where an agency's interpretation of a pertinent statute was clearly unrea-
sonable, however, or where an administrative record was insufficient to sup-
port an agency's findings and conclusions, the court did not hesitate to
reverse a decision and remand the matter for further deliberation.
In several of its more notable decisions, the Tenth Circuit undertook
constructions of the Government in the Sunshine Act
2 and the Privacy Act. 3
Both statutes are relative newcomers4 to the realm of administrative law and
have not yet been the subjects of substantial litigation. Thus, the Tenth
Circuit's analyses of certain of their provisions represent contributions to the
limited body of interpretive material. Another noteworthy decision this
term considered an association's standing to represent its members in an ac-
tion challenging the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's sexual
equality regulations for athletic programs. The court's ruling may well facil-
itate the first major attack'on these controversial requirements.
This article will survey twenty-seven of the Tenth Circuit's administra-
tive law decisions.5 Sheer numbers prevent a thorough analysis of each case,
but an attempt has been made to comment on questionable results and rul-
ings of special significance.
I. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
In Brice v. Day6 the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that exhaustion
of administrative remedies cannot be required when a party seeks to vindi-
1. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
4. The Sunshine Act became effective in 1977 and the Privacy Act became effective in
1974.
5. Additional administrative law cases reviewed and decided by the court of appeals dur-
ing the year but not incorporated into this discussion include: Patterson v. National Transp.
Safety Bd., No. 79-1426 (10th Cir., May 27, 1980) (affirmed FAA's suspension of mechanic's
certificate); Selman v. Califano, 619 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1980) (affirmed district court's affirm-
ance of Social Security Administration's denial of airline pilot's request for classification as in-
dependent contractor); Fry Bros. Corp. v. HUD, 614 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1980) (held that wage
determinations under Davis-Bacon Act are not subject to judicial review); Cowell v. National
Transp. Safety Bd., 612 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1980) (affirmed FAA's revocation of airman and
airman medical certificates); Terry v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 608 F.2d 418 (10th Cir.
1979) (affirmed FAA's suspension of commercial pilot's certificate); David v. Erdmann, 607
F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1979) (reversed ruling of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms refusing
import permit for pistol that was collector's item). See aLro notes 174 & 205 imfta.
6. 604 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1979), cert & id, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980).
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cate his constitutional rights in an action for monetary damages. The two
petitioners were prisoners at a federal penal institution in Oklahoma. Each
had filed suit in district court alleging that overcrowded conditions in the
facility subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment7 in violation of the
eighth amendment. 8 The lower court summarily disposed of both cases on
the ground that neither prisoner had used the formal procedures for review
of prisoners' complaints. 9
On their consolidated appeal, the petitioners urged that the exhaustion
doctrine does not apply to situations where constitutional rights are at stake,
at least when the relief requested is monetary compensation. They argued
that the available administrative procedure did not provide for such an
award; thus, the inadequacy of the administrative remedy obviated the ex-
haustion prerequisite of judicial action. °
The court of appeals relied on two very different grounds to justify its
ultimate holding that the petitioners were indeed obliged to exhaust their
administrative remedies. In analyzing the claims, the court first observed
that the petitioners sought to establish a private right of action for damages
under a constitutional amendment, an approach similar to those actions rec-
ognized by the United States Supreme Court in Bi'ens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents 11 and Davs v. Passman.12 To maintain such an action three criteria
must be satisfied. First, the complaining party must assert the violation of a
constitutionally protected right. Second, the party must have no means to
enforce the right other than through the judiciary. And, finally, the com-
plaining party must demonstrate that monetary relief will satisfactorily re-
dress the alleged constitutional violation.
13
With these requirements in mind, the Tenth Circuit determined that
facts would have to be developed to assess the validity of the petitioners'
cause of action. The court of appeals concluded that an administrative in-
quiry by the Bureau of Prisons would facilitate such a fact-finding process,
likening it to discovery in an ordinary civil case. The court explained that
this procedure should be utilized before the petitioners could properly seek
relief in the courts. 
14
In addition to recognizing the need for an administrative proceeding to
evaluate the strength of the petitioners' claims, the court of appeals acknowl-
edged the peculiar nature of the petitioners' status as prisoners. '5 In effect, it
deferred to the administrative machinery already in place for the resolution
of prisoners' grievances, thereby adhering to previous holdings reflecting a
7. Id. at 665.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
9. 604 F.2d at 665.
10. Id.
11. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (private damages action recognized for violation of fourth amend-
ment right to freedom from unlawful searches and seizures).
12. 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (private damages action recognized under fifth amendment due
process clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3, for alleged sex discrimination).
13. 604 F.2d 2d at 666 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 442
U.S. 520 (1979); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
14. 604 F.2d at 666-67.
15. Id. at 666.
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fervent desire to minimize judicial involvement with prison administra-
tion.' 6 The court concluded that the orderly and efficient disposition of pris-
oners' problems required the use of administrative channels. Petitions to a
court for relief cannot be "tickets to an immediate confrontation with the
guards and supervisors outside the prison and in the courtroom no matter
how they are framed."' 17 Thus, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the prisoners' complaints. The appellate court added
that in such circumstances a trial court would be equally justified in retain-
ing jurisdiction of a case while referring it to prison officials for administra-
tive review before taking further action itself. 18
II. RIPENESS
An attempt by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to
clarify orders disapproving a natural gas supplier's emergency curtailment
plan created further confusion when one of the supplier's customers sought
judicial review of the agency's action. In General Motors Corp. v. FERC19 the
Tenth Circuit held that an "Order Clarifying Prior Order," issued by the
FERC, was not sufficiently "final" to permit review, and the court therefore
dismissed the petition before it.
2 0
Cities Service Gas Company, the supplier, proposed a restriction on new
service connections in anticipation of possible reductions in the quantity of
natural gas available to meet its existing customers' demands. The plan pro-
voked a number of hearings and a plethora of orders. Initially, FERC re-
fused to approve the Cities Service proposal because it did not include an
index indicating consumers' use requirements as of January 1, 1978. 2' In a
second order, the Commission called for further hearings and provided that
high priority customers could anticipate continued service connections by
their supplier.2 2 A subsequent order indicated that the FERC was uncertain
whether to require the use index after all but cautioned that the agency
might impose an index "as of January 1st" 23 and warned that new connec-
tions would be made at the gas distributors' risk.
2 4
The FERC detected an air of uncertainty among consumers and suppli-
ers following this third order. Therefore, it issued one additional order de-
nominated "Order Clarifying Prior Order" and announced that any index
of requirements ultimately imposed would not incorporate the January date
but would be prospective in application.25 The petitioner, General Motors,
16. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978); Mower v. Swyhart, 545 F.2d 103
(10th Cir. 1976); Marchesani v. McCune, 531 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976); Rivera v. Toft, 477
F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1973); Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1973); Perez v. Turner,
462 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1972); Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1966).
17. 604 F.2d at 667.
18. Id. at 668.
19. 607 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1979).
20. Id. at 331.







objected to this decision, requested a rehearing, and upon denial of the re-
quest, appealed from the order.
The Tenth Circuit determined that the challenged order was merely a
"segment of ongoing hearings, and relate[d] to a subject not yet decided."'26
Thus, the court concluded that the order was not final and, therefore, was
not a proper matter for judicial scrutiny.2 7 The Commission had made no
decision to exact an index of requirements from Cities Service but had stated
only that any index requested would take effect prospectively. "This may be
a prehearing indication of [the FERC's] position, but this is not a matter ripe
for judicial review.
' '28
Additionally, the petitioner challenged the Commission's manner of is-
suing the clarification order, alleging that FERC could not properly enter
such an order without additional hearings. It further contended that the
agency had relied on events outside the administrative record to reach its
decision. 29 The appellate court refused to sustain these objections, holding
that the Commission had authority to change its position on the require-
ments index and on the applicable dates.30 It found that the FERC had
adequately explained the reasons for the change and concluded that new
supporting evidence was unnecessary. 3 1 "[Tihe Commission may act in a
pending case without a petition requesting action. The Commission has a
continuing duty to consider the consequences of actions it has taken in ongo-




The doctrine of primary jurisdiction endeavors to promote harmony be-
tween the judiciary and the administrative agencies. When a claim for relief
falls within the jurisdiction of both a court and an agency, the former may
suspend its proceedings and refer issues within the agency's authority and
expertise to it for resolution. Referral is not mandatory, but it is often done
to achieve uniformity in the application of certain statutes and regulations
and to utilize an agency's specialized knowledge so that final disposition of a
matter will be intelligent and accurate.
33
In Sunflower Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.34 the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the propriety of a district court's invocation of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine to justify both its refusal to entertain an anti-
trust action involving certain public utilities and its referral of the matter to
26. Id. at 333.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 332.
30. Id. at 333.
31. Id. at 334.
32. Id.
33. Seegene'rally United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-65 (1956); Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 19.01, .07 (1958); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 19.01
(1976).
34. 603 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1979).
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the Federal Power Commission (FPC) for resolution. The plaintiff, Sun-
flower Electric, a cooperative that sold electric energy to its Kansas mem-
bers, alleged in its complaint that the defendants had unlawfully combined
and conspired to monopolize the supply of "firm bulk power." Additionally,
it alleged that a contemplated merger of several of the defendant power
companies would violate the antitrust laws. 35 The district court perceived a
possibility of conflict between a judicial resolution of the merger issue and
the FPC's ultimate disposition of the merger application before it. 36 That
court also identified a need for the agency's expertise in the matter. Thus, it
elected to stay the antitrust action pending the agency's resolution of the
merger question.
37
The Tenth Circuit, however, concluded that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not apply to the proceeding. After a lengthy review and
analysis of the lower court's opinion, 38 of the underpinnings of primary juris-
diction, 39 and of the leading case law,4° it reversed the lower court's decision
and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.41 The appellate court's
reasoning was based on several considerations. First, it noted that public
utilities are not immune from the federal antitrust laws. 42 Next, it examined
the extent of the FPC's jurisdiction over the "interstate transmission of elec-
tricity" at the time Sunflower Electric commenced its lawsuit. 43 Finding
35. Id. at 793. Sunflower Electric based its claims on sections one and two of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
36. A public utility may not sell or lease its facilities or merge or otherwise consolidate with
another utility until it has obtained the government's approval. &ee 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a) (1976).
37. The district court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Ricci v. Chicago
Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973). Among other things, Rzcci counsels a court to abstain
from judicial review when "some facets of the dispute... are within the statutory jurisdiction"
of an agency. Id. at 302.
38. 603 F.2d at 793-95.
39. Id. at 795-96.
40. Id. at 796-98.
41. Id. at 799.
42. The court of appeals relied primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Ricci and Oiler Tailreach different conclusions
about the administrative and judicial roles in antitrust actions involving regulated industries,
prompting Professor Davis to observe that reconciling the two decisions "seems rather difficult."
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw OF THE SEVENTIES § 19.06 (1976).
The source of the conflict stems from a desire to accommodate, to the greatest extent possi-
ble, both federal antitrust and other regulatory schemes. The problem is recurring.
It arises when conduct seemingly within the reach of the antitrust laws is also at least
arguably protected or prohibited by another regulatory statute enacted by Congress.
Often, but not always, the other regime includes an administrative agency with au-
thority to enforce the major provisions of the statute in accordance with that statute's
distinctive standards, which may or may not include concern for competitive consider-
ations.
Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. at 299-300.
Ricci advocated deference to an agency's jurisdiction, at least when it is not immediately
clear whether the antitrust laws apply to the industry or transaction in question. Id. at 301-08.
Oiler Tail, however, in a factual setting involving power companies, held that public utilities are
clearly not insulated from antitrust liability and found that the FPC had no authority to pro-
vide remedies sufficient to redress the alleged violations. 410 U.S. at 373-74. Under those cir-
cumstances there seemed to be no reason for the district court to delay its review of the antitrust
claims.
43. 603 F.2d at 798. With the creation of the Department of Energy and the transfer of the
FPC's powers to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the latter agency re-
ceived additional authority with respect to the transmission of power. See id. at 793 n. 1. The
1981]
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that the Commission principally had responsibility for rates and charges44
and that prior judicial edicts45 disapproved of its ordering interconnections
of facilities or coordinated power development by utilities, 46 the court of
appeals concluded that the FPC had clearly "lacked authority to deal with
the problems which were present in the district court case. . . . [T]he refer-
ral to the Commission was a futile move. . . . [I]t would have been merely
a postponement of the day for coming to grips with the monopolizing is-
sue." 4 7 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the doctrine of primary ju-
risdiction was not relevant to the matter; a trial on the merits of the
plaintiff's claims could properly proceed. The mere possibility of a conflict
between a judicial decision and the agency's disposition of the merger appli-
cation was not enough to require abstention.
48
On rehearing, the court of appeals considered the effect of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 49 which amended the Federal Power Act
and increased the FERC's regulatory authority,5 0 on its earlier disposition of
Sunflower Electric. Acknowledging the general rule that a change of law must
be given effect in a pending case, 5 ' the court nevertheless invoked a limita-
tion on the rule that prevents its application if "manifest injustice" might
result or if a statute and its legislative history indicate a contrary intent.
52
The court of appeals found that a referral of the case to the FERC would
create additional delays and further prolong an already protracted lawsuit.
5 3
At bar Sunflower seeks treble damages . . . . injunctive relief in
the form of wheeling and power interconnects, and attorneys' fees.
It is possible that it would not be deprived of its rights in this re-
gard if the matter were to be transferred to the Commission. It is
certain, however, that they [sic] would suffer delay and a hazard of
complete denial because a delay of this kind is frequently critical.
5 4
In the congressional conference report to the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act, the Tenth Circuit found expressions of an intention to preserve
the courts' jurisdiction over actions involving public utilities that arise under
the antitrust laws. 55 This legislative history lent further support to the court
of appeals' conclusion that the new law could not be applied in Sunflower
court did not apply the Federal Power Act's amendments that created the broader authority
because Congress did not expressly give them retroactive effect. Id. at 798.
44. Id.
45. E.g., Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1975), afd, 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
See a/so Richmond Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
46. 603 F.2d at 799.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 798. See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. at 377.
49. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (Supp. III 1979)).
.50. See note 43 supra.
51. 603 F.2d at 800.
52. Id. (quoting Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
53. Sunflower Electric instituted the action in 1975. 603 F.2d at 793.
54. Id. at 801.
55. "[It is not intended that the courts defer actions arising under the antitrust laws pend-
ing a resolution of such matters by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. . . . T]he
courts have jurisdiction to proceed with antitrust cases without deferring to the Commission for
the exercise of primary jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. 95-1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, repninted
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7659, 7802.
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Electric to work a referral to the agency even though the FERC could, with
its new powers, grant the relief that the plaintiff requested. Thus, there
proved to be "no escape from the conclusion that the cause must be heard by
the district court."
56
IV. SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
A. Price Support Loans
The plaintiff in Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland,57 a class action, chal-
lenged the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regula-
tions authorizing price support loans to cooperatives for wheat and feed
grains. 58 Relying on the pertinent statutory language and on congressional
policy, as well as on the agency's construction of the controlling statute,59 the
Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary had such authority and affirmed the
district court's judgment.
6°
The plaintiff argued that the statute authorizing the Secretary of Agri-
culture to make loans to "cooperators" 6 1 contemplates that assistance will be
given to producers. Hiatt Grain urged that farmers' marketing cooperatives
are not producers and, therefore, are not cooperators within the meaning of
the controlling law.6 2 Observing that cooperatives are merely an aggrega-
tion of individual producers63 and noting that a cooperative must be ap-
proved by the Secretary to be eligible for a price support loan,64 the court of
appeals focused on statutory language directing the Secretary to furnish
price supports "through loans, purchases, or other operations,' 65 and "through
the Commodity Credit Corporation and other means available to him." 66 In
these phrases the court found evidence of sufficient congressional guidance
and direction to justify the agency's action. It also pointed to long-standing
congressional interest in promoting the use of marketing cooperatives to im-
plement farm programs.6 7 In the appellate court's view, this policy, coupled
with the express language of the statute, allowed only one conclusion.
Evidence of the agency's construction of the statutory mandate to make
price supports available further persuaded the court of the propriety of the
Secretary's wheat regulations. Acting on the assumption that it had the req-
uisite authority, the agency had on previous occasions allowed loans to coop-
eratives for such other commodities as cotton, peanuts, and rice. 68 The court
identified these actions as "a clear interpretation demonstrated by parallel
56. 603 F.2d at 802.
57. 602 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979), cerl. demed, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).
58. 602 F.2d at 930.
59. Id. at 931-33.
60. Id. at 933-34.
61. Id. at 931.
62. See 7 U.S.C. § 1428b (Supp. III 1979).
63. 602 F.2d at 932.
64. Id.
65. 7 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) (emphasis added).
66. IM. § 1421(a) (emphasis added).




programs," 69 and, in keeping with the judicial policy of according great
weight to an administrative body's construction of the laws it is directed to
execute, 70 the court found this evidence sufficient to uphold the challenged
regulations. 7' The court of appeals also presumed congressional awareness
of the agency's prior conduct with respect to price supports,72 implying that
Congress could have acted to prohibit loans to cooperatives had it disap-
proved of the practice.
In disposing of the plaintiff's allegation that procedural infirmities at-
tended the promulgation of the regulation, 73 the appellate court noted that
the agency had furnished a reasoned decision based on an economic analysis
and an impact statement. Furthermore, it had complied with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's rulemaking requirements. 74 Thus, the regulation
was free of defects.
B. Distribution of Royalty Oil
Unlike the administrative interpretation of the controlling statute in Hi-
att Grain & Feed, which the Tenth Circuit found to be consistent with a rea-
sonable interpretation and with congressional directives, 75 the Secretary of
the Interior's construction of the O'Mahoney Amendment 76 to the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 192077 was rejected by the court in Plateau, Inc. v. De-
partment ofthe Intertor78 as being inconsistent with the legislative intent. 79 Ac-
cordingly, the court of appeals upheld the district court's invalidation of
certain regulations enacted by the agency governing the distribution of roy-
alty oil 80 to refineries. 8 1
The plaintiff, a small oil refinery, objected to the Secretary's condition-
ing eligibility for sales of royalty oil on satisfaction of the Small Business
Administration's criteria for a "small business enterprise." 82 Plateau argued
that Congress had expressly limited recipients to refineries lacking a source
for crude oil supplies; thus, any attempt by the agency to impose further
restrictions exceeded the scope of its authority.
8 3
Following a brief review of the legislative history, 84 the Tenth Circuit
sided with the plaintiff, concluding that "the amendment itself identifies the
69. Id.
70. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965).
71. 602 F.2d at 934.
72. Id. at 933.
73. Id. at 934.
74. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
75. 602 F.2d at 934.
76. Act of July 13, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-506, 60 Stat. 533 (1946) (codified in 30 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1976)).
77. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1976).
78. 603 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1979).
79. Id. at 164.
80. According to the appellate court, "[r]oyalty oil is received as in-kind payment for royal-
ties from oil and gas leases on federal lands." Id. at 161 n. 1. The Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to sell such oil to refineries. Id. at 161 n.2.
81. Id. at 164.
82. Id. at 161. Set 30 C.F.R. § 225.2 (1978); 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-9(a)(1) (1980).




refineries it is intended to benefit. The challenged regulation goes beyond
what Congress authorized," 8 5 The court rejected the Secretary's claim to
broad, unfettered discretion in the administration of the royalty oil program.
Noting the variations in the agency's application of the statute, as reflected
in regulations promulgated through the years since its enactment, 86 the
court advised that "even if the Secretary had followed a consistent pattern of
administrative interpretation, to the extent such interpretation might have
been inconsistent with the congressional mandate, it would have been un-
availing."
8 7
C. Product Efctieness Standards
On a question of first impression concerning the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency's (EPA) power under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Acta to establish and regulate effectiveness standards for pesti-
cides, the Tenth Circuit rejected the agency's interpretation of its statutory
authority and confined it to a limited regulatory scheme. In SL. Cowley &
Sons Manufacturing Co. v. EPA89 the petitioner appealed the EPA's cancella-
tion of the registration of Cowley's Original Rat and Mouse Poison. The
EPA justified its action on the ground that the poison did not meet mini-
mum effectiveness standards for rodenticides.
9 °
The court of appeals distinguished the agency's legitimate authority to
sanction the misbranding and inaccurate labelling of products from the
EPA's assumed ability to enforce effectiveness criteria. "[T]he agency has a
duty under the statute to insure that the product satisfies" claims of efficacy
accompanying it; but, "[niothing in either the scheme or the specific lan-
guage hints at a broader standard." 9 1 In reversing the EPA's cancellation
order, the appellate court directed that the registrant manufacturer was enti-
tled to a hearing only on charges of improper labelling.
92
D. Transportation Matters
In Walker Field, Colorado, Pubhc Airport Authority v. Adams9 3 the Tenth
Circuit held that the Secretary of Transportation has broad discretion under
the Airport and Airway Development and Revenue Act 94 in granting
financial assistance for airport improvements. The plaintiff challenged the
Secretary's attempt to require Mesa County and the City of Grand Junction,
Colorado to act as sponsors and assume financial obligations for the local
airport's construction project. The two political subdivisions refused to co-
sponsor the venture. The plaintiff airport authority made improvements
85. Id. at 164.
86. Id. at 163.
87. Id. at 164.
88. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1976).
89. 615 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1980).
90. Id. at 1313.
91. Id. at 1314.
92. Id.
93. 606 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1979).
94. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1742 (1976).
1981]
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with its own funds, but the government declined to reimburse it without the
participation of the City and the County in the grant agreement.
95
Agreeing with the Secretary of Transportation's contention that he had
statutory authority to impose reasonable and necessary terms and conditions
on grants made under the Airport Development Act, 96 the district court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a legally cognizable claim. 9 7 The
Tenth Circuit also adopted the Secretary's argument and further pointed to
statutory provisions directing the Secretary to insure that sufficient funds are
available to cover construction expenses not shared by the federal govern-
ment.98 Relying on these broad mandates, the appellate court ignored the
airport authority's argument that neither the City nor the County fell within
the statutory definition of a sponsor.99
The plaintiff, joined by the State of Colorado as amicus, also claimed a
violation of the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, al-
leging that the Secretary's actions effectively overrode the State's express pol-
icy of promoting the financial independence of airport facilities.'00 The
court, however, disposed of this argument in short order, citing the federal
government's recognized authority to impose conditions on the funds it dis-
burses to the states. Furthermore, the court of appeals found no conflict
between the Secretary's requirement and the Supreme Court's instruction in
National League of Cities v. UseryI 0 that financial conditions cannot "displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions.'
1 0 2
Judge McKay, in dissent, opined that the majority's insistence that the
challenged administrative action imposed "no direct, mandatory terms and
conditions" on the state and its subdivisions and the majority's further as-
sumption that the state and its agencies, such as the Walker Field Airport
Authority could, by declining federal grants, easily avoid obligations exacted
by the federal government, 10 3 were superficial rationales for the decisions.
The dissenting judge noted that few states are financially able to provide all
services to their citizens without some federal assistance.
The possibility of refusing federal grants is often only apparent, not
real . . . . When grants have risen to this level of necessity, at-
tached conditions must withstand close constitutional scrutiny sim-
ilar to that applied in National League of Cities to direct regulation of
state governmental structure. The federally imposed requirements
here fail to survive that scrutiny. 1° 4
95. 606 F.2d at 293.
96. The Secretary pointed to statutory language directing him to offer project grants
"upon such terms and conditions as [he] considers necessary to meet the requirements of this
subchapter and the regulations." 49 U.S.C. § 1719 (1976).
97. 606 F.2d at 294. The district court also found that if a cause of action did in fact exist,
the United States Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over it. Id.
98. Id. at 296.
99. See id. at 295-96.
100. Id. at 297.
101. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
102. 606 F.2d at 297 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852).
103. 606 F.2d at 297.
104. Id. at 299 (McKay, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 58:2
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On constitutional grounds and on general principles of federalism, Judge
McKay would have reversed the district court's judgment.'0 5
In what was probably a last frantic effort, the States of Kansas and
Minnesota and the City of Nashville, Tennessee requested judicial assistance
to avert the termination of passenger rail service in their respective locales.
Their action on appeal, Kansas v. Adams, 10 6 sought reversal of a lower court's
dissolution of an order temporarily restraining the cessation of service. To
support their position, they urged that the Secretary of Transportation's
preparation of a plan for reduction of passenger service violated a number of
federal laws,' 0 7  including the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)10 8 and the Clean Air Act, 10 9 and was, therefore, improper and un-
authorized.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's action and affirmed its
denial of a preliminary injunction. After reviewing the language and the
legislative history of the Amtrak Reorganization Act of 1979,110 which incor-
porated and adopted the Secretary of Transportation's recommendations,
the court of appeals concluded that the Congress had closely scrutinized and
ultimately ratified the plan and had approved the procedures the agency
used to restructure the rail system.II' In thus lending its imprimatur to the
administrative report, the Congress effectively made the plan its own. "[W]e
have," the court said, "a direct Congressional decision designing the basic
rail system, without the necessity of following [NEPA's procedural provi-
sions]." 1 1 2 Mindful of the sacred principle of the separation of powers, the
Tenth Circuit refused to inquire further into the wisdom of the surrogate
legislative determination.' 
13
Even in this era of airline deregulation, it appears from the Tenth Cir-
cuit's third transportation decision that air carriers remain subject to some
administrative oversight. In fact, the court's holding in Frontier Airlines, Inc. V.
CAB' 14 indicates that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978'15 implies that
with respect to attempted departures from established routes, airlines are
still at the mercy of the federal regulators.
Frontier notified the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) early in 1979 of its
intention to discontinue service to Alamogordo and Silver City, New Mex-
ico. When the ninety-day notice period had elapsed without a replacement
carrier having entered the market, the CAB ordered Frontier to continue its
105. Id. at 300.
106. 608 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 963 (1980).
107. Id. at 863-64.
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). The other acts and regulations allegedly violated by
the Secretary's action were the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-421, 92 Stat.
923 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.), the National Historic Preservation Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976), and certain guidelines issued by the Council on Environmental
Quality, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1501.4 (1980).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978).
110. Pub. L. No. 96-73, 93 Stat. 537 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 45, 49 U.S.C.).
111. See generally 608 F.2d 864-66.
112. Id. at 866.
113. Id. at 867.
114. 621 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1980).
115. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
19811
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
service for several additional thirty-day intervals. Even after a new airline
offered to establish routes to the two communities, the CAB ordered Frontier
to maintain "back-up" service until it could be certain the new carrier was
capable of handling the routes. Disgruntled by its inability to ease out of the
Alamogordo and Silver City runs, the airline sought judicial review of the
Board's "back-up" orders." 16
Disposing quickly of the CAB's mootness argument" 17 and the agency's
allegation that Frontier had not exhausted its administrative remedies,
1 3
the Tenth Circuit proceeded to review the Board's authority under the 1978
Airline Deregulation Act. The court found that concomitant with the
agency's express statutory authority to order an airline to serve a route until
a replacement carrier steps in 1 19 is the implied authority to request an air-
line to provide support service until the new carrier is established on the
route. "The statutory grant of the greater implies a grant of the lesser, i.e.,
the power to compel actual service carries with it the power to order back-up
service. '"120 The court considered this ruling necessary to effectuate the legis-
lative intent "that no small community shall be left without essential air
services, on a continuing basis." 1 2i As in Hiatt Graih & Feed, Inc. v. Berg-
land'122 the Tenth Circuit found additional support for its decision in the
agency's construction of the applicable statute insofar as it was reasonable
and comported with the apparent congressional intent.
123
V. SUFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD
Two cases required the Tenth Circuit to consider the need for and suffi-
ciency of an administrative record. United States V. X-Otag Plus Tablets124 in-
volved a challenge to the district court's refusal to remand a case for
development of an administrative record. In Midwest Maintenance & Construc-
tion Co. v. Vela,' 2 5 on the other hand, the inadequacy of the existing record
precluded the district court from upholding an agency's decision.
The appellant in the X-Otag Plus Tablets case was a pharmaceutical
manufacturer of a prescription drug used to relieve muscular pain.' 26 The
116. 621 F.2d at 370.
117. "A 30-day order of the type here involved is almost a classic example of a matter which
is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125
(1973)).
118. In light of the Board's virtual certainty that it had authority to issue back-up orders, "it
is very doubtful that the Board would have vacated its back-up orders had a motion for recon-
sideration been filed." 621 F.2d at 371. Apparently, the court felt that the likely futility of an
appeal to the agency exempted Frontier from the exhaustion requirement. See American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Acree, 475 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Additionally, administrative
remedies need not be pursued "where the question is solely one of statutory interpretation." 621
F.2d at 371 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197-98 (1969)).
119. See 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. III 1979).
120. 621 F.2d at 372.
121. Id. at 371-72.
122. See 602 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). For a discussion of
Hi;att Grain & Feed, see text accompanying notes 57-71 supra.
123. 621 F.2d at 372.
124. 602 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1979).
125. 621 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1980).
126. 602 F.2d at 1389.
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Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seized a quantity of the drug and
instituted condemnation proceedings.' 27 It also sought an injunction to pre-
vent shipments of the drug in interstate commerce.' 28 To justify these en-
forcement actions, the government contended that X-Otag Plus was a "new
drug" within the meaning of the Food and Drug Act 129 and could not be
introduced into interstate commerce until a new drug application or an ab-
breviated new drug application had been approved by the FDA. 130 The
manufacturer had in fact submitted the required applications 1 3 1 but had not
done so prior to circulating the drug for public consumption.
132
The district court was called upon to determine whether the FDA's de-
cision to commence an enforcement action by way of condemnation consti-
tuted a declaratory order 133 requiring development of an administrative
record. 134 That court concluded the FDA's allegation that X-Otag Plus was
a "new drug" was not such an order but was, rather, an assertion of probable
cause, which was necessary to support the enforcement action.
135
The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed the lower court's refusal to re-
mand the case to the FDA. Crucial to its decision was a finding that the
condemnation proceeding had been brought against only one drug manufac-
turer and involved only a limited quantity of the drug.'3 6 These circum-
stances removed it from the realm of a declaratory order and obviated the
need for a formal record. The court distinguished Rutherford v. United
States,' 37 which, the appellant urged, required a remand to the FDA, noting
that in Rutherford the agency had classified laetrile as a "new drug" and
banned its distribution without issuing a formal rule or producing a record
to support its decision. The court found that the district court had ample
evidence to uphold the FDA's assertion that X-Otag Plus was a "new drug"
for probable cause purposes, and the appellate court concluded that the
manufacturer had had an opportunity at trial to rebut the FDA's case before
an injunction or destruction order was issued. '
38
The Tenth Circuit also upheld the trial court's finding that the govern-
ment had established by a preponderance of the evidence that X-Otag Plus
was a "new drug" for purposes of the condemnation proceeding. ' 39 But, the
court of appeals reversed the lower court's destruction order, concluding that
127. The FDA has authority to seize any misbranded or adulterated food, drug, or cosmetic
item introduced into interstate commerce. Se 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1976).
128. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 332(a) (1976).
129. Id. § 321(p)(1).
130. See id. § 355(a).
131. 602 F.2d at 1389-90.
132. Id. at 1390.
133. The Supreme Court has defined a declaratory order as a "self-operative industry-wide
regulation." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 147 (1967). Sergenerally I K. DA-
vis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.10 (1958).
134. United States v. X-Otag Plus Tablets, 441 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Colo. 1977).
135. Id. at 109.
136. 602 F.2d at 1390.
137. 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
138. 602 F.2d at 1390.
139. Id. at 1391.
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the statutory language allowing destruction of condemned articles 140 is "ad-
visory rather than mandatory and clearly implies that the court has some
discretion over the time and manner of destruction."
14
1
In Midwest Maintenance & Constructzon Co. v. Vela 142 the appellant sought
review of a ruling by the Secretary of Labor declaring its ineligibility to bid
on government contracts for a three-year period. The appellant corporation
was awarded a contract to maintain and repair certain federally owned
equipment in several regions in Texas. Federal law requires contractors
working for the government to pay wages compatible with those paid to
other employees "in the locality"' 14 3 but in no event should compensation
fall below the minimum wage' 44 provided in the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 145 Many government contracts include a wage determination with
which a contractor must comply. Midwest had received such a scale for
counties adjacent to where it performed its contract, but it had been given
nothing to indicate appropriate remuneration in the county where the work
was to be done.1
46
As Midwest was nearing completion of the contract, the Department of
Labor disclosed that the company had paid its employees less than the
amounts specified in the wage determination for the neighboring regions,
although it had paid more than the federal minimum wage. 147 Midwest, of
course, challenged the agency's attempts to force Midwest to compensate for
the alleged underpayments, and the dispute culminated in the filing of an
administrative complaint that charged the company with violations of cer-
tain sections of the Service Contract Act. 148 An administrative law judge
found Midwest liable for underpayments totalling $61,337.24; 14 9 the admin-
istrator of the Wage and Hour Division upheld the decision; and the Secre-
tary of Labor imposed the ineligibility sanction. The district court
subsequently affirmed these rulings.
150
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the finding that Midwest had
waived or relinquished its rights to obtain a clarification of the applicable
wage scale by failing to do so in a timely manner. The appellate court also
repudiated a finding that the company had taken advantage of competing
bidders when the contract was initially awarded. Both conclusions, the
court said, lacked support in the administrative record.151
The court also had to consider the meaning of "locality" as used in the
Service Contract Act 152 because the locality determines the appropriate
140. 21 U.S.C. § 334(d)(1) (1976).
141. 602 F.2d at 1391.
142. 621 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1980).
143. 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1), (2) (Supp. III 1979).
144. Id. § 351(b)(1).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1976).
146. 621 F.2d at 1047.
147. Id.
148. See 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1), (2) (Supp. III 1979).
149. 621 F.2d at 1048.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1049.
152. 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1) (1976). See text accompanying notes 143-145, supra.
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wage. Midwest argued that locality meant the place of performance, but the
agency disagreed and designated it as the location of the federal contracting
facility. 15 3 The Tenth Circuit attempted to find support for the agency's
contention in the record of the proceeding. 154 Observing that neither the
administrative law judge nor the wage and hour administrator had discussed
the terms of the bid invitation or the contract, the court noted the ambigui-
ties in both documents and chided the government for failing to specify the
meaning of "locality."' 155 Furthermore, the agency's failure to analyze the
contract and to indicate the reasoning underlying its ultimate definition of
the word proved fatal. On the basis of the "miserable administrative rec-
ord" 156 the appellate court refused to decide whether the place of perform-
ance or the location of the contracting facility controlled the compensation
rate. Thus, the court was unable to alleviate the void created by the absence
of appellate decisions on the issue.1 57 The Tenth Circuit Court further con-
cluded that the agency had failed to establish a "rational basis" for its deci-
sion.' 58 Accordingly, the court set aside the ineligibility sanction and
remanded the case to the district court with instructions that the matter be
returned to the Department of Labor for further proceedings.
159
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WARRANTS
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc.16° indicates that administrative inspections of private premises con-
ducted without warrants violate the fourth amendment's 61 prohibition
against unreasonable searches. In conformity with the Court's mandate, and
after officers of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) had been denied entry, the Department of Labor obtained a war-
rant ex parte to search the New Mexico plant of the W & W Steel Company
to confirm the existence of unsafe conditions as alleged by an employee. The
company subsequently contested the validity of the warrant in Marshall v. W
& WSteel Co., 1 6 2 charging that the agency had had no authority to obtain
the warrant ex parte and without notice. W & W Steel argued that the
regulation enabling the Department to secure inspection warrants 163 was in-
valid. The company asserted that the regulation had been improperly
amended by reason of the agency's failure to provide notice of the change
and opportunity for comment. 164
153. 621 F.2d at 1049.
154. The applicable standard for judicial review in this case provided that the agency's
finding would be conclusive if supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1048.
155. Id. at 1050.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1049.
158. Id. at 1051.
159. Id.
160. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
162. 604 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1979).
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1979).
164. 604 F.2d at 1325. The regulation was amended in 1978 to define "compulsory proc-
ess," which the agency is authorized to employ to gain entry to private establishments for in-
spections, to include ex parte warrants. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(d) (1979).
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In its review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit observed that the
Supreme Court seemed to approve the issuance of ex parte warrants in its
Barlow's opinion. 165 Having thus briefly considered the constitutionality of
ex parte warrants 66 and thereby implicitly holding that the Secretary of
Labor could properly procure one, the Tenth Circuit accepted the agency's
argument that the challenged amendment was an interpretive rule.' 67 As
such, it was expressly exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act's no-
tice and comment requirements 168 and was, therefore, validly promulgated.
The court of appeals also agreed that the employee's written complaint
and his supplemental written statement together with the OSHA compli-
ance officer's account of his attempts to verify the complaint were sufficient
evidence to justify a finding of probable cause to support issuance of the
inspection warrant. The court rejected the company's contention that the
scope of the warrant was too broad.' 69 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's order holding the W & W Steel Company in con-
tempt and imposing a fine for its repeated refusals to admit an OSHA
inspector bearing the search warrant.
70
VII. COMPULSORY PROCESS
One realm of the administrative scheme in which the judiciary is able to
take an active role is that involving the enforcement of compulsory process.
Although many agencies have statutory authority to issue subpoenas and
summonses, 17 1 the documents have no independent force. 172 Thus, if a
party chooses not to comply with an agency's request for information during
the course of a proceeding, the agency must seek judicial assistance to com-
pel submission to its directive.'
73
The Tenth Circuit considered several compulsory process cases during
the past year. Significant for their sheer numerosity are those cases the court
summarily disposed of involving the enforcement of Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (IRS) summonses. Three opinions' 74 merit brief consideration here be-
165. See 436 U.S. at 319-20.
166. 604 F.2d at 1325 n.1.
167. Id. at 1325-26. For a discussion of the force and effect of interpretative rules, see I K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 5.03 (1958); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw
TREATISE §§ 7.8-.18 (2d ed. 1978).
168. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
169. 604 F.2d at 1326.
170. Id. at 1326-27.
171. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1976) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board); 15 U.S.C.
§ 79r(c) (1976) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 1484(b) (1976) (Civil Aero-
nautics Board); 49 U.S.C. § 1903(b)(1) (National Transportation Safety Board).
172. Seegenerally I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 3.11, 3.12 (1958).
173. The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes courts to enforce compulsory process and
establishes the appropriate standard for review.
On contest, the court shall sustain the subpoena or similar process or demand to the
extent that it is found to be in accordance with law. In a proceeding for enforcement,
the court shall issue an order requiring the appearance of the witness or the produc-
tion of the evidence or data within a reasonable time under penalty of punishment for
contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply.
5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1976).
174. The opinions discussed in this section were ordered by the court to be published. Two
additional compulsory process opinions were issued for publication, both of which were consoli-
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cause they were the bases for the court's multiple affirmances of the district
courts'1 75 decisions to enforce the challenged process.
In United States v. Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. 176 and in United States v.
MacKay1 " the court of appeals relied on two Supreme Court decisions to
reject the taxpayers' arguments that the IRS summonses had been issued
improperly for the purpose of pursuing tax fraud investigations. The leading
case of United States v. Powell1 78 established, and the case of United States v.
LaSalle National Bank1 79 further refined, the test for ascertaining whether an
IRS summons has been issued for the permissible function of determining
civil tax liability or for the impermissible purpose of substantiating suspi-
cions of criminal conduct. To justify its use of the summons power, the Serv-
ice must show that its investigation is being conducted for a legitimate, that
is, a civil, purpose; that its request for documents or testimony relates to that
purpose; that the information sought is not already in its possession; and that
the statutory procedure has been followed. °8 0 Furthermore, the summons
must be issued before the IRS has recommended a criminal investigation by
the Department of Justice, and it must appear that the civil liability claims
will be pursued as well. 18 Finally, the taxpayer carries the substantial bur-
den of proving that the IRS has instituted compulsory process in bad
faith. 182
On the basis of the record before it, which apparently indicated to the
appellate court that the Supreme Court's requirements had been met, the
Tenth Circuit concluded in Income Realty that the district court had properly
ordered enforcement of the summonses at issue. The court of appeals also
found insufficient evidence of harrassment to support the taxpayer's
charge. i83 Similarly, in MacKay, the court carefully reviewed the Powell and
LaSalle decisions1 8 4 and scrutinized the record for evidence that the requisite
conditions had been met. ' 8 5 Ultimately, it affirmed the district court's judg-
ment enforcing the challenged IRS summons.1 86 Despite substantial crimi-
nal overtones to the Service's investigation, the court could not conclude that
the effort was solely in pursuit of a criminal sanction. "The activities of the
dations of multiple appeals. See United States v. Omohundro, 619 F.2d 51 (10th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Traynor, 611 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1979). Eighteen more enforcement opinions
were not issued for publication.
175. The federal court for the District of Colorado was beseiged by these summons chal-
lenges. It heard 17 cases. The District of Wyoming and the Western District of Oklahoma were
responsible for the balance.
176. 612 F.2d 1224 (10th Cir. 1979).
177. 608 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979).
178. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
179. 437 U.S. 298 (1978). See generally Note, The Institutional Good Faith Testfor Enforcement of
an Internal Revenue Service Summons: United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 56 DEN. L.J. 639
(1979).
180. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58; United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437
U.S. at 312.
181. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. at 318.
182. Id. at 316. "Without doubt, this burden is a heavy one." Id.
183. 612 F.2d at 1226.
184. 608 F.2d at 832-33.
185. Id. at 833-34.
186. Id. at 834.
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agents were entirely consistent with the [LaSalle] concept that criminal tax
fraud charges and civil penalties are interrelated."'
' 8 7
In United States v. Fahey'a8 two taxpayers attempted to prevent enforce-
ment of a summons with the novel contention that the federal government
has no constitutional authority to initiate civil suits against United States
citizens. Therefore, the taxpayers argued, a court is without jurisdiction to
enforce an IRS summons or, apparently, any other agency's compulsory
process. The Tenth Circuit's four-paragraph opinion, cited frequently in
subsequent enforcement decisions,'8a9 rejected this admittedly "creative" ar-
gument as "frivolous."
The court of appeals also had occasion to consider the exercise of an
agency's subpoena power. NLRB v. Dutch Boy, Inc. 190 challenged a district
court's enforcement of three subpoenas duces tecum issued by the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). While preparing for hearings on unfair
labor practice charges that had been filed against Dutch Boy, the NLRB
subpoenaed certain documents belonging to the company. When the latter
refused to produce all of the requested materials, the Board sought judicial
assistance. Dutch Boy also attempted to enforce a subpoena initially
granted it to obtain certain of the NLRB's records, which was subsequently
revoked by an administrative law judge. The lower court, however, dis-
missed Dutch Boy's application for enforcement, asserting that it lacked ju-
risdiction over the matter. 19 1
The Tenth Circuit, affirming the decision below, carefully limited the
issues on appeal to those concerning enforcement of the NLRB subpoenas
and thwarted Dutch Boy's attempts to interject for review certain alleged
procedural irregularities in the administrative law judge's revocation of its
subpoena. 19 2 The court found no fault with the district court's dismissal of
the company's claim, holding that a district court has no power "to hear a
private application for enforcement of a subpoena."' 93 Additionally, the
court found evidence in the record indicating that the documents sought by
the NLRB satisfied the prerequisites for issuance of a subpoena in that they
" 'relate[d] to or touch[ed] the matter under investigation.' "194 Therefore, it
187. Id. at 833. In the course of its analysis, the Tenth Circuit rejected, as contrary to
LaSa/le's directive, the taxpayers' "somewhat ingenious argument" that the burden of proving
bad faith should shift to the government when a taxpayer has shown that the IRS is seeking
information for a criminal prosecution. Id. at 833.
188. 614 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1980).
189. A number of taxpayers in the court's unpublished opinions, perhaps unaware of the
Fahey decision, raised this argument. See, e.g., United States v. Youmans, No. 79-1437 (10th Cir.
Mar. 28, 1980); United States v. Pielstick, No. 79-1885 (10th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980); United States
v. Kelderman, No. 79-1873 (10th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
190. 606 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979).
191. Id. at 931.
192. See id. at 933.
193. Id. at 932. The appellate court's statement seems broad enough to include any sub-
poena issued by an agency to a private party. The case cited in support of this proposition,
however, holds only that the NLRB's subpoenas may not be enforced by a private party in a
district court. Judicial action is appropriate only in a proceeding to review the Board's final
order in a matter. Se Wilmot v. Doyle, 403 F.2d 811, 814-16 (9th Cir. 1968).




concluded that the lower court had not arbitrarily enforced the Board's sub-
poenas or abused its discretion and therefore could not be reversed.'
95
Dutch Boy also failed in its attempt to assert that the NLRB had issued its
subpoenas solely to harrass the company. The court of appeals held that
Dutch Boy had not met its burden of establishing the agency's improper
purpose. 1 96
VIII. GOVERNMENT LARGESSE
An apparent conflict between state and federal welfare laws occasioned
the controversy before the Tenth Circuit in Nolan v. De Baca.' 9 7 In imple-
menting its plan for the federally funded Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program (AFDC), the State of New Mexico promulgated a regula-
tion that reflected an aspect of its community property system. Specifically,
the State required one-half of the income earned by the spouse of an eligible
child's natural or adoptive parent to be treated as income of the natural or
adoptive parent. ' 98 The spouse's legal obligation to support the child was
not a concern. In the Nolans' situation this computation substantially re-
duced the AFDC payments to the children. 199 Although the mother had no
actual income, she was credited with one-half of the sum that her husband,
who was her children's nonadoptive stepfather, earned. This constructive
income was deemed available to meet the children's needs.
Claiming that New Mexico's regulation blatantly conflicted with the
pertinent regulation enacted by the Federal Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (HEW), which prohibits consideration, in the calculation
of AFDC benefits, of funds available to family members who have no legal
duty to support the dependent children,2° ° Mrs. Nolan instituted an action
against the State's Department of Health and Social Services. She sought an
injunction forbidding the agency to enforce the regulation and succeededin
district court. That tribunal found the Supremacy Clause20 ' controlling and
granted a motion for summary judgment in Mrs. Nolan's favor.
20 2
Acknowledging the well-established rule20 3 that local AFDC regula-
tions "may not contravene Social Security Act provisions or valid HEW reg-
ulations," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
2 °4
"Operation of appellant's community property regulation obviously contra-
venes the federal act and HEW's regulation.
'" 20 5
195. 606 F.2d at 932.
196. Id. at 933.
197. 603 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1979).
198. Id. at 812-13.
199. Before the regulation was adopted their benefits totaled $163.00 per month; after pro-
mulgation of the regulation the monthly payments dropped to $2.00. Id. at 811.
200. 45 C.F.R. § 223.90(a) (1979).
201. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
202. Set 603 F.2d at 811.
203. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968).
204. 603 F.2d at 812-13.
205. Id. The Tenth Circuit heard several other cases during the year involving various
forms of federal financial assistance to individuals. Edwards v. Califano, 619 F.2d 865 (10th
Cir. 1980) and Markham v. Califano, 601 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979), concerned social security
benefits. In Edwards, the court reversed the district court's alfirmance of HEW's denial of child
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IX. RIGHTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
Two cases reviewed by the Tenth Circuit considered the rights of gov-
ernmental employees under certain federal statutes.2 0 6 Both involved rela-
tively narrow issues.
In Hurley v. UntedStates20 7 the appellant, making his second appearance
before the court of appeals, sought construction of the Back Pay Act,
208
which authorizes payment to a federal employee of all remuneration that he
or she would have received had he or she not been the victim of "an unjusti-
fied or unwarranted personnel action."'20 9 He contended that the damages
award he received following a determination that he had been unjustifiably
transferred from his Federal Aviation Administration post in Texas to a posi-
tion in Oklahoma should have included his sizeable claim for a per diem
travel allowance. Hurley reasoned that during the period of his illegal trans-
fer he was on travel status and, accordingly, was entitled to appropriate com-
pensation.
2 io
The court of appeals, however, ruled that the Back Pay Act does not
encompass travel expenditures, thereby affirming the district court's denial
of the appellant's claim. The statute permits reimbursement only of pay an
employee would normally have received in the absence of the government's
erroneous action.211 Finding support in a decision from the United States
Court of Claims,2 1 2 which rejected an identical argument, the Tenth Circuit
declined the proffered invitation "to engraft a provision that is not a part of
the Act."
2 13
Resolution of the petitioner's claim in Philh/ps v. Merit Systems Protection
Board2 14 necessitated an analysis of the application of the Civil Service Re-
insurance benefits on the ground that the agency had not rebutted the statutory presumption of
death arising from the father's unexplained absence of seven years. 619 F.2d at 868. The court
affirmed a denial of disability benefits in Markham, holding that the evidence sustained a finding
that the claimant was not so disabled as to be incapable of engaging in gainful employment.
601 F.2d at 536. Finally, in Gutierrez v. Califano, 612 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1979), the Tenth
Circuit reversed the lower court's order declaring a claimant eligible for Black Lung benefits
after HEW had reached a contrary decision. The appellate court determined that data relied
upon by the lower court to reach its decision had been improperly evaluated and were insuffi-
cient to overcome substantial evidence offered by the agency to support its denial of an award.
Id. at 1249.
206. A third case, Stritzl v. Uisted States Postal Serv., 602 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1979), re-
viewed a discharged federal employee's right to a hearing; it is therefore treated in Part X Proce-
dural Due Process, fira at 23 1. A fourth decision interpreting federal employees' rights under the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), is discussed in detail in Part Xl." The Privacy Act, infia at
238.
207. 624 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1980).
208. 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1976).
209. Federal regulations define "unjustified or unwarranted personnel action" as "an action
of commission . . .or of omission . . .which thereby resulted in the withdrawal, reduction, or
denial of all or any part of the pay, allowances, or differential ... otherwise due an employee."
5 C.F.R. § 550.802(c) (1980).
210. 624 F.2d at 94.
211. /d. at 94-95.
212. Morris v. United States, 595 F.2d 591 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
213. 624 F.2d at 95.
214. 620 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980).
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form Act of 1978.215 Phillips was removed from his position in the
Merchant Marine in 1973. He appealed to the Civil Service Commission,
which upheld the action, and to the Board of Appeals and Review, which
affirmed the Commission's decision. Subsequently, a federal district court
heard the case and remanded it to the Merit Systems Protection Board, suc-
cessor to the Civil Service Commission,21 6 for a new hearing including cer-
tain witnesses who had previously been unavailable. Following this hearing
the Board affirmed the Commission's initial decision, and Phillips sought
review by the court of appeals. The Merit Systems Protection Board, assert-
ing that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction, moved for dismissal.
2 17
The Tenth Circuit examined the provisions of the Civil Service Reform
Act that authorize judicial review of the Board's final orders in a federal
court of appeals. It focused, however, on a savings clause that makes the
statute inapplicable to administrative proceedings pending on the statute's
effective date. With the assistance of a regulation promulgated by the Merit
Systems Protection Board specifying that an agency proceeding is considered
pending or "existing" when "the employee has received notice of the pro-
posed action," 2 18 the court concluded that the new law did not apply to the
case under consideration.2 19 The petitioner had been notified of the person-
nel action before the Reform Act became effective even though the final
adverse decision had been rendered after the statute's effective date. Grant-
ing the motion to dismiss, the court of appeals explained that Phillips' suit
could be initially instituted only in a federal district court or in the court of
claims. 220 The Tenth Circuit thus joined five other circuits that have
reached a similar conclusion.
22 '
X. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO A HEARING
In two very different factual settings the Tenth Circuit rejected conten-
tions that requirements of due process and of correct administrative proce-
dure mandated hearings. Stritzl v. United States Postal Service 222 involved a
discharged federal employee, and Colorado v. Veterans Administrationr 2 23 con-
cerned the liability of state-supported educational institutions for overpay-
ments of veterans' educational benefits.
Edwin Stritzl, a post office employee, was terminated for poor work
habits and low productivity prior to the expiration of his ninety-day proba-
tion period. He was discharged without a hearing, and, after unsuccessful
attempts to appeal the action through the American Postal Workers Union
215. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 28, 31,
38, 39, 42 U.S.C.).
216. For the court's summary of the 1979 reorganization of the Civil Service Commission,
see 620 F.2d at 218.
217. 620 F.2d at 218.
218. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.191(b) (1979).
219. 620 F.2d at 219.
220. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1976).
221. The court's ruling conforms with those of the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and District of
Columbia Circuits. See cases cited in 620 F.2d at 219.
222. 602 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1979).
223. 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979).
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and the Civil Service Commission, he filed suit in the District Court for the
District of Colorado. He alleged that the conditions of his termination vio-
lated the Postal Reorganization Act 224 and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.2 25 The trial court rejected Stritzl's arguments, and, on appeal,
the Tenth Circuit upheld the judgment for the Postal Service.
2 26
The appellate court, in its review of the statutory and constitutional
claims, first observed that the federal government has traditionally imposed
a probationary status on new employees. During the period of probation an
employee's rights are limited, and he or she is subject to termination for good
cause without either a hearing or an opportunity to appeal. The court also
noted that the postal workers' union acknowledges, and apparently accepts,
this "historical fact," for the collective bargaining agreement affords proba-
tionary employees no access to the union's grievance procedures.
22 7
The court then turned to Stritzl's contention that the Postal Reorgani-
zation Act's hearing requirement 228 changed this policy. The statute ex-
pressly protects "employment rights," 229 and the appellate court agreed with
the district court that a probationary employee, lacking such rights, cannot
be considered a true employee for purposes of the statutory directive.
We do not regard this statutory language as creating new substan-
tive "employment rights." Specifically, we do not regard the statu-
tory language here relied on as creating a right whereby
probationary employees are entitled to receive a hearing before
their probationary employment is terminated. If Congress had in-
tended to create such an employment right for probationary em-
ployees, it would have said so in clear and understandable
language. Congress did not do so, however.
2 30
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit refused to step where Congress had deemed
it unnecessary to tread.
2 3 1
In dictum, apparently intended to shed additional light on the Postal
Reorganization Act's fair hearing requirement, the court instructed that this
provision is limited by other sections of the statute authorizing the inclusion
of grievance procedures in collective bargaining agreements. 232 Thus, such
procedures may be valid although they conflict with the notion of a fair
hearing as contemplated by the Act.
233
Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that the Postal Service had not deprived
Stritzl of a liberty interest by disseminating information about his perform-
224. Pub. L. No. 94-421, 90 Stat. 1303 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.).
The act directs that employees be given "an opportunity for a fair hearing on adverse actions."
39 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
225. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
226. 602 F.2d at 250-51.
227. Id. at 251.
228. 39 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1976).
229. Id.
230. 602 F.2d at 251.
231. See id. at 251-52.
232. Id. at 252.
233. The court cited a decision from the Seventh Circuit, Winston v. United States Postal
Serv., 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1978), as authority for this proposition.
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ance as a postal clerk. 234 Stritzl had argued that the Golden, Colorado post
office's release of a negative evaluation of Stritzl's performance to the Lit-
tleton, Colorado postmaster violated a liberty interest and required a hear-
ing. The court of appeals ruled, however, that the Postal Service's
unfavorable characterization of Stritzl was not comparable to the "badge of
infamy" identified by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Constantineau235 nor
was it the type of "stigma" the Court contemplated in Board of Regents v.
Rolh. 236 Quoting from one of its 1976 opinions,23 7 the Tenth Circuit con-
cluded that Stritzl had failed to establish a liberty interest worthy of consti-
tutional protection. " '[N]othing present in this case indicates appellant has
had such a stigma imposed upon him as to foreclose future employment op-
portunities.' "238
In Colorado v. Veterans Administration,239 the State of Colorado attempted
to establish its right to a hearing in matters concerning its liability to the
Veterans Administration (VA) for excess educational benefits paid by the VA
to veterans enrolled in local colleges and universities. In an action brought
in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado,2 40 the State
challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Educational Assistance
Program 24 ' that authorizes the VA to seek reimbursement from an educa-
tional institution for payments made to an ineligible student through some
fault or omission attributable to the institution.2 42 Additionally, the State
contended that the procedure used by the VA to establish liability violated
constitutional and statutory hearing requirements.
243
The district court held the disputed statute constitutionally sound, find-
ing the state's liability "a simple matter of a contractual duty flowing from
the school to the state certifying agency to the VA," 244 which had been in-
curred when the state agreed to monitor and report on student status as a
condition to participation in the benefit program. The trial court ruled that
such imposition of liability is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
234. 602 F.2d at 252-53.
235. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
236. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
237. Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976).
238. 602 F.2d at 253 (quoting Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335,
1339 (10th Cir. 1976)).
239. 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979).
240. The district court's decision in this suit is reported in Colorado v. Veterans Administra-
tion, 430 F. Supp. 551 (D. Colo. 1977).
241. The Educational Assistance Program is established and administered according to the
provisions set forth in 38 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1698, 1700-1766, 1770-1796 (1976). The challenged
statute provides that:
Whenever the Administrator finds that an overpayment has been made to an eligible
person or veteran as the result of (1) the willful or negligent failure of an educational
institution to report as required . . . to the Veteran's Administration excessive ab-
sences from a course, or discontinuance or interruption of a course by the eligible
person or veteran, or (2) false certification by an educational institution, the amount
of such overpayment shall constitute a liability of such institution, and may be recov-
ered . . . in the same manner as any other debt due the United States.
38 U.S.C. § 1785 (1976).
242. Colorado v. Veterans Administration, 430 F. Supp. at 558.
243. Id. at 560.
244. Id. at 558.
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function,2 4 5 and it also concluded that the practice does not offend the doc-
trine of intergovernmental immunity. 246 After a consideration of the alleged
procedural defects, however, the lower court agreed with the state's conten-
tion that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)247 required a hearing as a
part of the VA's adjudication of a school's liability for overpayments. 248
While acknowledging that the agency had in fact afforded some opportunity
for a hearing, the court nevertheless reasoned that "[b]ecause liability deter-
minations against educational institutions are subject to judicial review,...
those determinations [must] follow the procedures outlined in the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act."
'249
Both the State of Colorado and the VA appealed the district court's
judgment to the Tenth Circuit, which upheld the finding of constitutional-
ity, agreeing with the lower court's contractual analysis. 250 An amend-
ment 25' to the challenged statute, however, justified-and perhaps
necessitated-a modification of the decision on the procedural issue. The
appellate court observed that the amendment allows an offset of overpay-
ments against fees owed to an institution as compensation for compliance
with the statutory reporting requirements only if a school does not contest
the VA's claim or if a court has reviewed and upheld the VA's finding of
liability. 252 The court also noted that the VA must sue to collect overpay-
ments it believes are due just as it would sue to collect any other debt. 25 3
Given this express access to a judicial forum, "the administrative proceed-
ings . . . become somewhat less significant.
'254
The Tenth Circuit found neither an express directive nor a "clear indi-
cation" that the applicable statute required an adversary hearing on the rec-
ord as contemplated by the APA. 255  Stating that the APA creates no
hearing rights that do not already exist, the court of appeals concluded that
the Act did not apply to the VA's overpayment claims. Satisfied that a col-
lection action would assure the accuracy of the VA's determinations of over-
payment liability,256 the Tenth Circuit modified the district court's
judgment to the extent that it imposed on the Veterans Administration the
245. Id.
246. Id. at 559.
247. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-559, 701-706 (1976).
248. 430 F. Supp. at 561.
249. Id. (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modifwtd, 339 U.S. 908 (1950)).
250. Colorado v. Veterans Administration, 602 F.2d 926, 927 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. dnud,
100 S. Ct. 663 (1980).
251. GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-202, tit. III, § 304(a)(1), 91 Stat. 1433
(1977) (amending 38 U.S.C. § 1785 (1976)).
252. Prior to its amendment, the statute had authorized the VA to recover overpayments to
a school by referring the claim to the General Accounting Office for collection in court and by
offsetting the payments against other amounts due the school from the VA. 38 U.S.C. § 1784
(Supp. 1 1977).
253. 602 F.2d at 928. Set 38 U.S.C. § 1785 (Supp. 1 1977) (overpayments "may be recov-
ered . . . in the same manner as any other debt due the United States.").
254. 602 F.2d at 928.
255. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
256. "[T]he section expressly provides for a suit for collection at the end of the administra-
tive road, and there is no setoff for reporting fees any longer . . . . Any right to review the
agency determination is during the course of the suit brought by the United States to collect."
602 F.2d at 928-29.
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requirement of a hearing.
2 57
XI. THE SUNSHINE ACT
The Tenth Circuit had occasion during this past year to construe the
Government in the Sunshine Act (the Sunshine Act). 258 In Hunt v. Nuclear
Regulatoy Commission25 9 the court of appeals considered the Sunshine Act's
applicability to deliberations of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(ASLB) and concluded that it does not apply. Thus, meetings 26° of the
ASLB need not be open to the public. The decision is especially significant
in light of the present controversies attending the use of nuclear power and
the structural soundness of existing and proposed nuclear facilities. Addi-
tionally, the basis for the court's ruling is instructive because it highlights the
value of statutory definitions.
The case had its origin in a request submitted to the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC) by the Public Service Company of Oklahoma for a
license to construct a nuclear power plant. During the agency's considera-
tion of the application an internal report prepared by the General Electric
Company became relevant to several matters. General Electric had previ-
ously contracted with the Public Service Company to furnish the nuclear
steam supply system for the proposed power plant, and it was reluctant to
disclose the report, which allegedly contained trade secrets. Eventually,
however, the company agreed to produce the document on the condition
that the sessions of the ASLB at which it was used would be closed to the
public.
2 6 1
The appellant, a resident of Tulsa, which is near the site of the proposed
facility, challenged in federal district court the decision to hold in camera
hearings. His complaint asserted that this practice would violate the Sun-
shine Act and sought a temporary restraining order as well as permanent
injunctive relief.2 62 The lower court, however, after a detailed analysis of
the legislative history,263 concluded that the statute does not apply to adju-
dicatory hearings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. 264 It dis-
missed the case, and the disappointed plaintiff appealed.
In its opinion affirming the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit
examined the composition and functions of the NRC and the ASLB, as well
as the relationship between the two.265 The NRC consists of five members
who are presidential appointees. It is responsible for processing the applica-
tions of utility companies wishing to construct nuclear power facilities, and
its staff conducts the initial review of all such applications. Subsequently,
257. Id. at 929.
258. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).
259. 611 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1084 (1980).
260. The word "meetings" must necessarily be used liberally here, given the court's ultimate
construction of the statute. See text accompanying notes 266-272, infta.
261. 611 F.2d at 333.
262. Id.
263. See generally Hunt v. NRC, 468 F. Supp. 817, 820-22 (N.D. Okla. 1979).
264. Id. at 822.
265. See generally 611 F.2d at 334-35.
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hearings are conducted by a three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board, and, at this stage, the NRC becomes an independent party in the
licensing process. The Board is established by the NRC, but it is not a fixed
entity; its members are selected from a panel of experts appointed by the
Commission, and the composition of any given Board may change from
hearing to hearing. Essentially, the ASLB is the Commission's adjudicatory
arm.
The court of appeals undertook to discover whether the ASLB is an
agency within the meaning of the Sunshine Act. Agencies subject to the
open meeting requirements of the statute are those "headed by a collegial
body," the majority of whose members are appointed by the President with
the Senate's advice and consent. 266 The composition of the ASLB obviously
precludes its characterization as such an agency.
267
The Sunshine Act also encompasses agencies' subdivisions, however,
and the lower court went to great lengths to determine whether the statutory
language, "subdivision thereof, ' ' 268 referred back to agency or to collegial
body. With the assistance of the legislative history, the district court decided
that the reference was to collegial body. 269 Were agency not defined in
terms of its presidentially appointed fellows, the Board would seem by any
ordinary understanding to be a subdivision of the NRC. But, because the
ASLB includes no Commission members, it cannot be a subdivision of the
collegial body.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's interpretation of the
statute's definition of subdivision 270 and found additional support for the
position in the definitions of "meeting" and "member." 2 71 The former con-
sists of the deliberations of agency members, who are, in turn, defined as
those individuals belonging to the "collegial body heading an agency.
'272
Only these specific deliberations are open to the public. Whatever else the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board may do, it clearly does not hold "meet-
ings" because it has no "members."
Although the court of appeals found adequate support for the district
court's decision in the Sunshine Act itself, it briefly considered the NRC's
regulations implementing the statute, which specifically exclude from cover-
age those "subdivisions" of the "agency" not composed of members of the
governing collegial body.2 73 It also observed that other agencies have
promulgated similar rules. 274 Thus, the court implicitly exercised a form of
the traditional judicial deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of
the laws it must execute.
27 5
266. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1) (1976).
267. 611 F.2d at 335.
268. Hunt v. NRC, 468 F. Supp. at 820-21.
269. Id. at 821.
270. 611 F.2d at 336 & n.2.
271. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2), (3) (1976).
272. Id. § 552b(a)(3).
273. 611 F.2d at 337.
274. Id. at 337 n.3.
275. Se Part IV- Scope of Authorit,, supra at 217.
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Without having to resort to the Sunshine Act's authorized exemp-
tions,2 76 which the court probably would have had to strain to apply,27 7 the
Tenth Circuit declared that the NRC may properly close meetings of certain
of its branches lying beyond the reach of the statute's definitions. Clearly,
the Sunshine Act does not expose administrative deliberative processes as
completely as might be desired. 2 78 The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Hunt
highlights the loopholes, and its close definitional analysis may prove helpful
to other agencies seeking solid support for their endeavors to escape the man-
date of the Sunshine Act.
279
Appellant Hunt lost his battle with the NRC on another front as well.
When the Chairman of the ASLB panel hearing the Public Service Com-
pany's application for a construction permit requested spectators to leave the
hearing room prior to the Board's consideration of General Electric's inter-
nal report, Hunt and a companion refused to leave. To make their point
they chained themselves to the doorframe of the hearing room. The hearing
was delayed while a marshall cut the chains and removed the two men, who
were ultimately charged and convicted by a magistrate for disrupting gov-
ernment employees in the performance of their official duties.280 The dis-
trict court affirmed the conviction, and the defendants appealed.
In United States v. Rankit 28 ' the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's
judgment. To justify their conduct, the defendants had argued that the Sun-
shine Act forbade the closure of the ASLB hearing and that, therefore, the
federal employees were not performing official duties when conducting-or
attempting to conduct-the in camera hearing.282 The Hunt decision dis-
posed of the first part of their contention, but the court of appeals added
that even if the defendants had correctly construed the Sunshine Act, they
would have had no defense to the charges against them. An individual's
good faith belief in the propriety of his or her actions does not excuse con-
duct that impedes administrative proceedings.28 3 "[T]he defense of 'good
faith belief' is no defense. The defendants could not thus take the law in
their own hands."
284
276. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1976).
277. The statute does, however, allow closed meetings when disclosure of "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" is
likely to occur. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(4) (1976).
278. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 5:44 (2d ed. 1978).
279. The district court found only one other judicial interpretation of the statutory defini-
tions in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. United States Parole Comm'n, No. 78-1016 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 30, 1978). Hunt v. NRC, 468 F. Supp. at 821. The Pennsylvania court reached a similar
conclusion.
280. Hunt and his companion had violated 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.304 (1978).
281. 616 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1980). The facts discussed in the preceding paragraph are set
forth in 616 F.2d at 1169.
282. Id. at 1169-70.
283. Id. at 1170. See also United States v. Young, 614 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1980); Armstrong
v. United States, 306 F.2d 520 (10th Cir. 1962).
284. 616 F.2d at 1170.
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XlI. THE PRIVACY ACT
It has been suggested that the Privacy Act 28 5 may not prove to be as
universally significant a law as the Freedom of Information Act. 286 But,
"[flor some individuals, for example federal employees concerned about the
contents of their personnel files, the Act may provide new rights and reme-
dies of substantial importance. "287 In Parks v. Internal Revenue Service, 288 the
Tenth Circuit gave substance to this prediction.
The Parks plaintiffs, employees of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
complained to the federal district court in New Mexico that lists of IRS
employees who had not purchased government savings bonds were supplied
to other IRS employees for use in soliciting additional sales of the bonds.
Plaintiffs contended that this disclosure violated the Privacy Act's general
prohibition against furnishing "any record which is contained in a system of
records" without the consent of the "individual to whom the record per-
tains." 289 The use made of the lists could not, they argued, be characterized
as "routine" 29° and as such be made exempt from the disclosure proscrip-
tion;29 1 nor could the agency establish that its officers and employees needed
the lists "in the performance of their duties."'292 The district court was not
persuaded, however, and it dismissed the plaintiffs' action after concluding
that the disclosure was, in fact, part of a "routine use."
293
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's judgment of
dismissal, declaring that the plaintiffs had stated a claim under the Privacy
Act sufficient to entitle them to monetary compensation from the agency.
294
The court of appeals found evidence in the statute's legislative history that
indicated that by restricting dissemination of personnel records Congress ex-
pressly intended to protect federal employees "who do not comply with or-
ganization norms and standards" from "internal blacklisting."' 295
Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that the agency's use of the lists
in question could not be routine, primarily because the IRS had not fol-
lowed the notice and comment procedure required by the Privacy Act for
designating a routine use.2 96 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit found that the
plaintiffs' claims adequately alleged a violation of the Privacy Act's general
proscription against disclosure.
285. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
286. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
287. W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, CASES AND COM-
MENTS 622 (7th ed. 1979).
288. 618 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1980).
289. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976).
290. A "routine use" is "the use of [a] record for a purpose which is compatible with the
purpose for which it was collected." Id. § 552a(a)(7).
291. See id. § 552a(b)(3).
292. See id. § 552a(b)(1).
293. 618 F.2d at 680.
294. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1976) (allows minimum damage award of $1,000 for inten-
tional or willful violations of the Act).
295. 618 F.2d at 681 n.1 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., repn'ntedr
11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6916, 6966). Congress specifically cited nonparticipation
in savings bond programs as an example of a failure to follow "organizational norms." Id.
296. 618 F.2d at 681-82. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1976).
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To be entitled to relief for an allegedly illegal disclosure, a party must
also plead that he or she has suffered some "adverse effect" from the circula-
tion of the confidential information. 297 Thus, the court's inquiry was not
complete upon its conclusion that the complaint sufficiently alleged a viola-
tion of the statute. Noting that the Privacy Act is rooted in the tort of inva-
sion of privacy, the court of appeals reasoned that "the invasion of the right
. . . is the essence of the action." 298 Such conduct may not cause pecuniary
damage, but mental and psychological harm are foreseeable consequences.
Therefore, the appellate court found the plaintiffs' allegations of psychologi-
cal distress and embarrassment sufficient to establish the requisite adverse
effect. 299 That the claims tended to show an injury personal to the plaintiffs
necessarily alleviated any standing problem.
3 ° °
Having found the allegations concerning a violation of the Privacy Act
and its resultant harmful impact ample to sustain the plaintiffs' cause of
action, the Tenth Circuit next considered whether the plaintiffs had ade-
quately contended that the actions of the agency's officials were so inten-
tional and willful as to warrant the award of damages authorized by the
statute.30 1 Notwithstanding the absence of specific declarations of inten-
tional and willful conduct, the court concluded that the facts which the
plaintiffs had alleged permitted an inference of misconduct descending to
the prescribed levels of impropriety. 30 2 While the employees were entitled to
seek damages, the court of appeals held that they were not entitled to the
injunctive relief which they had requested. Those sections of the Privacy Act
authorizing the issuance of injunctions contemplate their use as aids in
amending an individual's record and in ordering production of records im-
properly withheld from a requesting party.30 3 The court found no provision
permitting injunctions to restrain other violations of the Act. "[W]here...
the statute provides for certain special types of equitable relief but not
others, it is not proper to imply a broad right to injunctive relief."
3 4
Several of the district court's holdings in the Parks case did survive the
Tenth Circuit's scrutiny. Specifically, the court of appeals affirmed the rul-
ing below that certain IRS employees were improperly joined as defendants
inasmuch as the Privacy Act only authorizes suits against an agency. 30 5 In
addition, the appellate court agreed that, under the existing circumstances,
the National Treasury Employees Union had no standing to sue the IRS,
either on its own behalf or for its members.
3 °6
297. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (1976).
298. 618 F.2d at 683.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. When a court determines that an agency "acted in a manner which was intentional or
willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of (A)
actual damages . . . but in no case . . . less than the sum of 51,000; and (B) the costs of the
action .. " 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1976).
302. 618 F.2d at 683.
303. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2), (3) (1976).
304. 618 F.2d at 684.
305. Id See also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (1976).
306. 618 F.2d at 684-85.
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In this case of first impression 30 7 the Tenth Circuit construed the Pri-
vacy Act with an eye toward effectuating Congress' "self-help enforcement
program" that encourages litigation by individuals. "[I1t is only through this
process that the objects of the Act can be realized."'30 8 The court strictly
enforced the congressional directive to the administrative agencies to publish
information about the records they maintain and to give notice and an op-
portunity for comment on all routine uses of such records. It is clear from
the court's opinion that an agency cannot claim routine use as a defense to a
challenged disclosure if the use has not been specifically included in the re-
quired public notice.
30 9
While holding the agencies to a high standard in the use and circulation
of the records they maintain, the Tenth Circuit was liberal in its application
of the statutory conditions for a damages action. It gleaned from the Act
three sets of allegations necessary to shield a complaint from a dismissal mo-
tion, but it is apparent from the Parks decision that a plaintiffs pleading
burden is not heavy. A complaint must first allege a cognizable violation of
the Privacy Act. Next, it must contain evidence of some personal detriment
to plaintiff arising from the alleged violation. The Tenth Circuit has made it
clear that psychological harm qualifies as an "adverse effect," although it
remains to be seen both how severe the damage must be to warrant compen-
sation and what financial awards it may yield. And, finally, the complaint
must indicate, although it need not specifically allege, that the agency's con-
duct was willful or intentional. Some evidence that administrative officials
knew of the improper disclosure and did nothing to prevent it is likely to
suffice. The allegations must reveal the conduct to be something more than
mere negligence but less than "premeditated malice."3 10 The requirements
identified by the court should prove to be useful guidelines to future plain-
tiffs seeking to vindicate their statutory privacy rights.
In Parks, the Tenth Circuit made clear its intention to interpret the
Privacy Act "in the spirit which attended its enactment" so as to afford max-
imum protection for the "very sensitive. . right of an individual to be free
of unnecessary invasions of his privacy.13 11 Soon after rendering the Parks
decision, the court had an opportunity to indulge in construction of another
section of the statute. Resolution of the dispute in Volz v. Department ofJus-
tice3t 12 required an analysis of an investigatory-materials exemption3 13 to the
Privacy Act's general mandate that allows an individual access to federal
records concerning the individual. In its review, the court of appeals ac-
knowledged and endeavored to uphold the legislative desire to protect the
privacy not only of those about whom the federal government collects infor-
mation but also of those who assist the government in compiling its informa-
307. d. at 679.
308. Id. at 685.
309. Id. at 681-82.
310. Id. at 683.
311. d. at 685.
312. 619 F.2d 49 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 397 (1980).




tion. As Volz indicates, sometimes the interests of the latter group outweigh
those of the former.
James Volz was an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
who was suspended briefly for disciplinary reasons. While probing his con-
duct, the FBI obtained information from a lawyer acquainted with Volz.
The information was provided under an express promise from the agency
that it would preserve the informant's confidentiality. Subsequently, the
FBI agreed to relinquish to Volz all materials compiled during its discipli-
nary investigation, and the lawyer informant released the Bureau from its
promise as to almost all of the information he had furnished. Volz de-
manded disclosure of the balance of the lawyer's communications to the FBI
but his request was refused. He commenced an action in federal district
court under the Privacy Act and obtained an order for the release of the
withheld material. 31 4 On the government's appeal, however, the Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court's decision.
3 15
The court of appeals stated the issue in the case to be whether the statu-
tory exemption from disclosure of information furnished under a promise of
confidentiality 3 16 is applicable when "the source of the information is known
but the specific confidential information itself is not known to the party seek-
ing disclosure." 31 7 After observing that the primary purposes of the exemp-
tion are to protect the privacy of the government's informants and to
encourage the divulging of material, but confidential, information that
would otherwise elude the government's grasp, the court concluded that dis-
closure of information provided by a source whose identity is no longer a
secret would, nevertheless, defeat these ends. The court also found that such
disclosure would discourage individual cooperation with the agencies as well
as deter future voluntary disclosures to requesting parties. Therefore, the
court of appeals nullified the order for production.
318
314. Like the plaintiffs in Parks, Volz availed himself of the statutorily authorized private
civil action, see id. § 552a(g)(l); unlike those individuals, however, he requested a form of in-
junctive relief explicitly recognized by the statute. See id. § 552a(g)(3)(A).
315. 619 F.2d at 49-50.
316. Id. at 50.
317. The head of any agency may promulgate rules . . to exempt any system of
records within the agency from [disclosure] . . . if the system of records is-
(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability,
eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal
contracts, or access to classified information, but onl to the extent that the disclosure of such
material would reveal the identit of a source who furnished mnformat ion to the Government under an
express promise that the identily of the source would be held in confidence .
5 U.S.c. § 552a(k)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
318. 619 F.2d at 50. The court also reversed the district court's award of attorney's fees and
costs to the plaintiff, reasoning that he had not "substantially prevailed" to the extent necessary
to justify recovery of such expenses. Id. The Privacy Act authorizes an assessment against the
federal government of fees and costs incurred in obtaining relief from an agency's unlawful
refusal to release records if "the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(3)(b) (1976).
Judge Doyle filed an opinion dissenting from the reversal of the attorney's fee award. He
enumerated six factors courts are to weigh when determining whether to order the reimburse-
ment of a prevailing party, see 619 F.2d at 51 (Doyle, J., dissenting), and observed that the court
of appeals had considered none of them in rendering its decision. He expressed a desire to
"approve the modest award in the interests of promoting the public interest." Id.
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The key to the Tenth Circuit's decision lies in its recognition of an "in-
extricable connection between the source and the substance of a confidential
disclosure." 3 19 But, it appears that in its fervor to promote the objectives of
the Privacy Act, the court of appeals neglected the plain language of the
exemption. 320 Certainly the source and the information are connected, but
the bond may not be "inextricable." The exemption voices concern for the
identity of the source;32 1 the promise of confidentiality it contemplates seems
to extend to that identity and not to the substance of the knowledge fur-
nished. It would seem that material acquires its confidentiality because the
informant desires anonymity. Likewise, this special status should change
when the donor's identity is known, provided that his or her identity has not
been revealed by the agency either deliberately or inadvertently in breach of
its promise or has not been otherwise improperly disclosed. Indeed, the
source's voluntary release of an agency from its undertaking to preserve con-
fidentiality would seem to indicate a lack of concern for continued secrecy.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Volz v. Department ofJuslice effectively
precludes a literal reading of the Privacy Act's investigatory materials ex-
emptions and extends the restriction, which should be narrowly con-
strued, 322 beyond its statutory scope. This result may have no substantial
effects, but the court's gloss seems clearly at odds with the statute's direction.
Under the Volz facts, the Tenth Circuit's eagerness to protect privacy is mis-
placed.
32 3
319. Id. at 50.
320. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973).
321. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5) (1976). For the text of the statute see note 317 supra.
322. See Nemetz v. Department of the Treasury, 446 F. Supp. 102, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
323. The federal district court in Nemetz v. Department of the Treasury, 446 F. Supp. 102
(N.D. I11. 1978) emphasized throughout its opinion that protection of the identity of a confiden-
tial source is the primary focus of the section 552a(k)(5) exemption.
It is clear on the face of the statute that only iformation which would identt_5 the source of
confidential information may be exempted by agency regulation. Thus, the government's argu-
ment that all information received under a promise of confidentiality is exempt must
be rejected at the outset. To the extent Section 552a(k)(5) applies it exempts only infor-
mation which would reveal the identity of the source.
Id. at 104 (emphasis added). See also id. at 106-07. The district court expressly distinguished the
Privacy Act's confidentiality exemption from that included in the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1976), which exempts all information obtained from a confidential
source. 446 F. Supp. at 104 n.I.
Both the Nemetz case, and a recent decision from the Fourth Circuit, Ryan v. Department
of Justice, 595 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1979), would have an agency seeking to claim a disclosure
exemption under the Privacy Act make certain specific showings. In Ryan, the court of appeals
required evidence that the agency had promulgated rules specifically exempting designated sys-
tems of records from the Privacy Act's disclosure provisions. The Fourth Circuit Court also
expected explicit evidence of the agency's reasons for invoking a claim of exemption for such
records. 595 F.2d at 957-58. See also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1976). The Nemetz opinion similarly
required promulgation of regulations exempting the records at issue, 446 F. Supp. at 104, and
further insisted that "general averments of promises of confidentiality are insufficient" to justify
immunity from disclosure under section 552a(k)(5). Id. at 105. The narrow scope of the exclu-
sion "requires finding a promise of confidentiality as to each source sought to be withheld." Id.
See also Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1978) (dictum); Mervin v. Bonfanti, 410 F.
Supp. 1205 (D.D.C. 1976).
In Pole, the Tenth Circuit imposed no similar conditions on the agency's claim for exemp-




Although standing lurked as a peripheral issue in Parks v. Internal Revenue
Service,324 it created no major obstacle to jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit
did have one opportunity, however, to consider exclusively whether a plain-
tiff had "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness" 325 necessary to create a case or contro-
versy, which is a constitutional prerequisite ofjudicial review. 326 Resolution
of the customarily difficult standing question was further compounded by
the plaintiff's status as an association seeking to vindicate the interests of its
members.
327
In 1976, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) brought
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas challenging
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's (HEW) controversial
regulations 328 that require educational institutions to provide equal athletic
opportunities for both male and female students. 329 The NCAA purported
to represent both itself and its member institutions; the latter did not join
individually in the action. After an extensive review of the extent law of
standing as articulated by the Supreme Court in a number of opinions
330
and after a detailed analysis of the NCAA's allegations, the district court
dismissed the case.33 ' It held that the NCAA lacked standing to challenge
the regulations on its own behalf for the principal reason that "the prospect
of any injury at all is. . .purely speculative and dependent upon the hypo-
thetical actions" of its member institutions. 332 The court further ruled that
324. 618 F.2d 677, 633, 685 (10th Cir. 1980). See Part XII" The Ptwacy Act, supra at 238.
325. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
326. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
327. For a discussion of the problems attending associations' standing, see Note, Standng to
Assert Constitutionaljus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974); Note, From Net to Sword: Organiza-
tional Representatves Litigating Their Members' Claims, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 663.
328. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1979).
329. Critics argue that HEW exceeded its authority under title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976), in promulgating the regulations. The contention
is that the agency impermissibly extended the scope of the statute by forbidding sex discrimina-
tion not only in educational programs receiving federal financial assistance but also in those
programs deemed to be benefiting from funds used by actual recipients. "In HEW's view, the
only test of coverage is whether the ... institution is a recipient of any federal assistance; if so,
all activities of the agency come within the provisions of the Act." Kuhn, Tile IX: Emploment
and Athletics are Outside HEW'sJurisdiction, 65 GE.OL.J. 49, 63 (1976).
Athletic programs are not routinely funded by the government, but the regulations require
schools and universities receiving federal benefits in other programs to provide equal opportuni-
ties "in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered ... and no re-
cipient shall provide any such athletics separately" on the basis of sex. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a)
(1979). The stakes for noncompliance are high; an institution found to have permitted or con-
doned sex discrimination may lose its federal financial assistance. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
For a detailed discussion of specific ways HEW has allegedly expanded the reach of title
IX, see Note, Title IX Sex izucn)mation Regulations: Impact on Pn'ate Education, 65 Ky. L.J. 656,
684-88, 689-94 (1977).
330. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
331. NCAA v. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425, 439 (D. Kan. 1978).
332. Id. at 433. The NCAA alleged that the regulations, insofar as they conflicted with the
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the association had no standing to sue as a representative of its members
because it had not alleged facts sufficient to support a finding of actual or
threatened harm to them.33 3 Likening the NCAA's action to a request for
pre-enforcement judicial review, the district court concluded that
U]udicial consideration of the claims . . . would merely embroil
the court in abstract disagreement over the scope and validity of
the entire Title IX regulatory scheme so far as it relates to athletic
programs and activities at the post-secondary educational level.
Because the parties have through various possibilities of judicial
review an adequate forum for testing the [regulations] in a concrete
enforcement situation, the court sees neither a practical need nor a
lawful excuse for . . . review of the kind sought here.
334
To its undoubted chagrin, the district court may well find itself in-
volved in that "abstract disagreement," for on appeal the Tenth Circuit re-
versed and remanded the decision. 335 Although the court of appeals agreed
with the lower tribunal's holding that the NCAA lacked standing to sue on
its own behalf,336 the appellate court concluded that the complaint alleged
sufficient facts to confer standing on the association as a representative of its
members.
337
In most instances, an individual or an organization cannot assert the
rights of third parties in a legal action. Those parties must protect their
interests themselves. 338 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that
in some circumstances, an entity, such as a trade association, may be an
appropriate vehicle for vindicating the rights of its members.3 3 9 Accord-
ingly, the Court has developed three conditions that must be met before an
association may represent its members in a judicial proceeding. First, it
must appear from the facts alleged that the individual members themselves
would have standing to sue. 340 It must further appear that "neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested" requires the active participation of
an individual member.34 And, finally, the interests that the association
seeks to protect in its suit must be "germane" to the purpose for which it
exists.
34 2
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the NCAA's allegations in light of these
association's rules, would force members to withdraw from the NCAA or compel the NCAA to
change its rules. Id. at 431-32.
333. Id. at 434-39.
334. Id. at 439.
335. NCAA v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1392 (10th Cir. 1980).
336. Id. at 1387.
337. Id. In a concurring opinion Judge McKay expressed agreement with the majority's
holding that the NCAA had standing as a representative of its members. He submitted, how-
ever, that that ruling obviated any need for deciding whether the association could sue in its
own right. The section of the court's opinion discussing this issue he termed "mere dictum." Id.
at 1392 (McKay, J., concurring).
338. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
339. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
340. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. at 341; Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. at 511.




three requirements. Turning first to the standing of the members as individ-
uals, the court scrutinized the complaint for evidence that the members had
sustained "injury in fact" from the challenged regulations. 343 It rejected the
district court's "ungenerous reading" of the pleadings and found that injury
to the educational institutions comprising the NCAA could effectively be
inferred from the allegations. "Compulsion by unwanted and unlawful gov-
ernment edict is injury per sr. Certainly the cost of obeying the regulations
constitutes injury. ' 344 The court also found that the schools were harmed
insofar as the regulations prevented them "from developing their intercolle-
giate sports programs as they see fit."' 3 4 5 The court of appeals saw further
evidence of injury in a "change in the status quo" compelled by the regula-
tions.346 Although the complaint itself included no specific claim of direct
injury to the members' rights and interests, the court was willing to find such
injury on the basis of the information it did contain.
347
Because the NCAA challenged a governmental agency's authority, the
Tenth Circuit ruled that the members, if they sued individually, would have
to satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) standing requirement.
The APA requires a showing that the complaining party has suffered a "le-
gal wrong" from the agency's action or has been otherwise "adversely af-
fected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute. '34 The
Tenth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's "zone of interests" test 349 to
determine whether the member institutions could qualify under the APA.
3 5 0
In a rather strained interpretation, the court determined that the NCAA and
its members had an interest in invalidating HEW's regulations, an interest
that properly lay within Title IX's instruction to the agencies to implement
the prohibition against sex discrimination using rules and regulations "con-
343. " 'Injury in fact' means concrete and certain harm .... [I]t must be certain to hap-
pen." 622 F.2d at 1386. The court implicitly acknowledged the substantial confusion shroud-
ing the standing doctrine when it observed that "[s]uch injury in fact is the one constant
element in the judicial statements about standing." Id.
344. Id. at 1389.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1390.
347. See generaly id. at 1388-89.
348. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
349. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). Standing concerns "whether the interest sought to be protected... is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question." Id. at 153.
350. See general'y 622 F.2d at 1386, 1389-90. The court equated Data PAcessing's zone of
interests analysis with the APA's "adversely affected or aggrieved" requirement. Thus, it con-
cluded that to be aggrieved means to be arguably within the statute's protected zone of inter-
ests. Id. at 1386. Admittedly, the issue is confused and eludes precise definition, but it seems
that the more proper analysis is just the reverse of the court's suggestion; that is, if one can
identify the rights and interests that a law is intended to protect and can "arguably" find one's
own interests within its reach, then when an agency allegedly violates the statute, one becomes
an aggrieved or adversely affected party with standing to sue. To have an interest lying within
the statutory zone is not the same as to be aggrieved by an agency's action. Rather, the former
is a condition precedent to the latter. See generally Association of Data Processing Serv. Organi-
zations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153.
In any event, the Tenth Circuit liberally interpreted the zone of interests requirement,
concluding that it would be satisfied if a "sensible relation" could be found "between some




sistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute."'35' The court con-
sidered this directive as indicative of a statutory design to protect against
unnecessary and unwarranted regulation.3 52 Accordingly, the court found
that the interest of the NCAA and its members fell within the statute's pro-
tective zone. An alleged violation of the statute gave them standing to seek
redress. 
3 53
Having found that the institutional members of the NCAA had sus-
tained actual injury sufficient to entitle them to sue HEW in their own right,
the Tenth Circuit next inquired whether the interests at stake in the case
related to the NCAA's organizational objectives. Among the association's
avowed purposes are the initiation and improvement of intercollegiate ath-
letic programs and the preservation of institutional control of intercollegiate
sports.3 5 4 Although the member institutions' interests necessarily extend be-
yond those of the NCAA to other educational programs, the court found
that inasmuch as the litigation attacked regulations affecting sports activi-
ties, the members' interests could be deemed compatible with the associa-
tion's purposes. Therefore, the NCAA was arguably a suitable
representative.3 55 The court, however, was not willing to assume that the
members supported the association's endeavor on their behalf. In fact, it
acknowledged that many NCAA member institutions also belonged to the
Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), which had in-
tervened as a defendant to support HEW's regulations, and the court recog-
nized that the NCAA's litigation goals could be entirely incompatible with
the dual members' desires. 356 This potential absence of uniform interests is
relevant to the constitutional standing requirement, for if an organization's
members do not support its motives but instead align themselves with the
opposition, then no case or controversy actually exists, and a court has no
authority to exercise its jurisdiction.357 Thus, the Tenth Circuit imposed a
qualification on the test for associational standing, which would in some cir-
cumstances compel an organization to identify precisely its members' con-
cerns and to ascertain whether a true identity of interests exists. If this task is
not performed, then a court might not be able to determine whether the
interests which an association purports to represent are "germane" to its pur-
pose.
We hold that when an association does not have standing in its
own right, and it is not clear which side of the lawsuit the associa-
tion's members would agree with, one or more of the members
351. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
352. See 622 F.2d at 1390. In fact, Title IX was enacted to assure women of educational
opportunities equal to those available to men. In a broader sense, the statute protects both
sexes' interests in equal access to education by attempting to insure that discrimination on the
basis of sex does not occur in federally funded educational programs. If anything, the statute
endorses additional regulation rather than discouraging it. Perhaps, however, the Tenth Circuit
found this connection sufficient to satisfy its "sensible" relationship variation on the zone of
interests test. See note 350 supra.
353. 622 F.2d at 1390.
354. Id. at 1391.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1391-92.
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must openly declare their support of the association stance, and
they must do so through those officials authorized to bring suit on
their behalf. Moreover, if more members of the association declare
against the association's position than declare in favor of it, the as-
sociation does not have standing, for then the parties in the lawsuit
most likely would not be adverse.
358
Apparently, an additional allegation must henceforth appear in complaints
filed by organizations seeking to represent the interests of third parties who
comprise their membership. Even those that would seem to have standing to
sue in their own right would be well advised to allege an identity of interests
because it seems impossible to predict when a court will agree with an associ-
ation's claim of injury in fact. Because the NCAA's complaint included a
statement evidencing its members' support for the lawsuit,359 the NCAA sat-
isfied not only the Tenth Circuit's new requirement but the Supreme Court's
test as well. The organization and its constituents were not at odds.
Finally, the appellate court considered whether individual participation
of the NCAA's members was necessary to a fair resolution of the controversy.
Finding issues of law common to all and observing that the injunctive and
declaratory relief requested would, if granted, benefit the members equally,
the court concluded that their direct involvement was not essential. 36° Hav-
ing completed its analysis of the NCAA's claims and their relationship to the
standing prerequisites for a representative of third parties' interests, the
Tenth Circuit found no bar to the association's maintenance of its suit chal-
lenging HEW's athletic regulations. Accordingly, the court of appeals re-
versed and remanded the district court's decision.
36
1
Certainly the two decisions in NCAA v. Califano exemplify the flexibility
of the third party standing doctrine.362 Whereas the district court was strict
and exacting in its interpretation of the rule and its application to the plain-
tiff's allegation, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was more generous in its
analysis and was willing to infer claims of injury where no specific ones were
made. The appellate court's examination of existing standing law does not
illuminate this muddled realm, and segments of its reasoning are notably
contorted;363 nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit's identity of interests criterion
represents a concrete addition to the law of standing.
36
The case, however, has a significance apart from this contribution. The
Tenth Circuit's holding that the NCAA has standing to bring its action may
358. Id. (emphasis in original).
359. Id. at 1392.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 79-82 (1978).
363. See notes 350 & 352 supra and accompanying text.
364. A student commentator observed in 1974 that the courts have not often considered
how to resolve the problem of competing interests within an organization, which eliminate the
organization's efficacy as a true representative of its members. "[O]ffensive use of organiza-
tional representation is relatively new and organizations usually use it in safe situations. As the
procedure becomes more established, organizations will make less conservative use of it. The
courts will then have to consider the permissible limits of the action." Note, From Net to Sword-
Organizational Representatives Litigating Their Menbers' Claims, supra note 327, at 671.
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facilitate a significant challenge to the validity of the athletic regulations. A
federal district court in Ohio found one of HEW's requirements unconstitu-
tional,365 but there has apparently been no broad attack on the entire regu-
latory scheme. HEW's employment regulations, 3 66  purportedly
promulgated pursuant to Title IX, 367 have been invalidated by several fed-
eral courts368 on the ground that they exceed the agency's scope of authority
under the statute and duplicate rules enacted in accordance with Title
VII's36 9 mandate. It is not inconceivable that upon close analysis a court
would find the controversial athletic regulations similarly excessive. 370 And,
certainly, the NCAA seems a logical entity to launch the offensive, if only for
the sake of streamlining the litigation.
371
CONCLUSION
The number of administrative law cases heard during the past year in-
dicates that the federal government has made its presence known and felt
within the realm of the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction. In resolving the myriad
controversies generated by governmental actions, the court of appeals ad-
hered to traditional rules and applied established legal principles. Accord-
ingly, its decisions seem sound, if not otherwise notable. The Sunshine and
Privacy Act opinions, however, are likely to enhance the relatively meager
collection of cases construing and interpreting those statutes. Furthermore,
the standing ruling in NCAA v. Califano may ultimately have a significant
impact on collegiate athletic programs. Only in Volz v. Department ofjusice
does the court seem clearly to have overstepped statutory bounds.
Diane L. Burkhardt
365. Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High School Ath-
letic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978). "To the extent it authorizes recipients of federal
aid to deny physically qualified girls the right to compete with boys in interscholastic contact
sports, Subsection (b) of 45 C.F.R. 86.41 is violative of the Fifth Amendment and must be held
to be unconstitutional." Id. at 759.
366. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1979).
367. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
368. See, e.g., Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aft'd, 597
F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 467 (1979); Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F.
Supp. 866 (D. Me. 1978), affdsub noma., Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (lst
Cir.), ceri. denied, 100 S. Ct. 467 (1979); Seattle Univ. v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8241 (W.D. Wash. 1978); Romeo Community Schools v. United
States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aJ'd, 600 F.2d
581 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 100 S. Ct. 467 (1979).
369. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
370. See generally Kuhn, note 329 supra.
371. The NCAA has approximately 862 member institutions. I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF As-
SOCIATIONS (14th ed. N. Yakes & D. Akey eds. 1980). Their participation as plaintiffs could
make the proceeding unwieldy and unnecessarily protracted. Structuring the suit as a class
action might alleviate some problems, but obtaining class certification would impose additional
hurdles. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
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